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On 16 June 2017, 40-year-old Murat Okumu# was abducted in broad daylight by
several plainclothes men in Izmir, Turkey’s third largest metropole. The abductors
arrived in two unmarked cars, pushed Mr. Okumu# into one of them and drove
off after telling astonished onlookers that they were police. Officers dispatched
to the area told eyewitnesses, based on the license plates they saw on security
camera footage, that the abductors were indeed with the police (counter-terrorism
unit), but that they could not intervene. It seems like no one has since seen or
heard of Mr. Okumu#. This was by no means an isolated incident. Several other
individuals with alleged links to the Gülen movement, which the government
has accused of being behind the July 2016 coup attempt, have been disappeared.
Some have since re-appeared. Others, like Mr. Okumu#, remain missing. Families
inquiring into the whereabouts of their loved ones have faced a wall of silence.
At first glance, this is remarkable. After all, Turkey is a nominal democracy, an EU
accession country, a member of the United Nations and the Council of Europe and
a state party to their human rights treaties, including the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR), and subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR). In such a country, individuals are not ought to be
disappeared by the authorities. And yet, for those of us who know Turkey all too well,
this is just new wine in old bottles.
The 90s phenomenon
The Turkish state has been disappearing its unwanted citizens since, at the very
least, the phase after the 1980 coup d’état. The peak was in the 1990s, when the
Kurdish region was torn apart in a violent civil war between the Turkish military
and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Hiding behind emergency justifications
provided under international human rights law, Turkey was engaged in atrocious
violations that were characteristic for Latin American military dictatorships. Turkish
security forces and their proxies were subjecting civilians to collective punishment,
sometimes for no other reason than being Kurdish or for their actual or perceived
sympathies for the PKK. In cities, civilians were dragged into cars, in many cases
never to be seen again. At best, their tortured and bullet-ridden bodies were found
on the side of a road. Kurdish lawyers, politicians, activists, journalists and doctors
who dared to speak up against state violence were summarily executed. In remote
rural areas, villagers were forced to become paramilitaries and fight with the military
against the PKK or else face forced displacement. Entire villages were set on fire, at
times with animals and humans inside the burning buildings.
The scale of enforced disappearances in Turkey remains unknown. In fact, Turkey
is not a State party to the 2010 International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICPPED). According to the UN Working
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID), there were 183
- 1 -
cases of enforced disappearances in Turkey in the period of 1992-1996. In 1994
alone, 72 new cases were reported to the WGEID. According to domestic experts,
NGOs and Kurdish lawyers, the number is much higher. The majority of enforced
disappearances occurred in the Kurdish region.
The handful of cases concerning enforced disappearances in the Kurdish region
that managed to find their way to Strasbourg provide important insights into the
nature of these atrocities. In rural areas, villagers were disappeared after military
raids (e.g. 2001 Çiçek v. Turkey) or abducted by plainclothes men known to be
security forces (e.g. 2004 Tahsin Acar v. Turkey). In urban centres, individuals were
disappeared after being detained by security forces (e.g. 2000 Ertak v. Turkey)
or abducted by plainclothes men often arriving in a white Renault car, carrying
two-way radios and introducing themselves as police officers (2008 Osmano#lu v.
Turkey). In some cases, cars abducting the victims had licence platesbelonging
to security forces (e.g. Av#ar v. Turkey) and/or were driven straight into police or
gendarme stations. In others, individuals were disappeared after last seen entering
the gendarmerie stations. The most high-profile case concerned the disappearance,
in 2001, of Serdar Tan## and Ebubekir Deniz, two politicians from the pro-Kurdish
People’s Democracy Party (HADEP), after they were summoned to the gendarmerie
station. They remain disappeared to this day.
The ECtHR’s Response
Just as enforced disappearance was a practice of the Turkish state in the 90s, so
was government denial. Families of the disappeared encountered official denial and
impunity in their quests for truth and justice (WGEID 1994 Annual Report, para. 396).
Even in instances where eyewitnesses had seen the disappeared individuals being
detained by the security forces, the authorities would uniformly deny that detention
ever took place and claimed, without any evidence, that the missing individual had
voluntarily joined the PKK (e.g. 2000 Timurta# v. Turkey) or had been kidnapped by
the PKK (e.g. 2017 Kurt v. Turkey).
Standing before the ECtHR as a supranational court of law with strict evidentiary
rules which deems the principle of subsidiarity to be of paramount importance,
Kurds found it extremely difficult to convince the court that enforced disappearances
were a matter of state policy in the Kurdish region. Such a ruling would have been
of great importance for future claimants, particularly under two aspects. On the
one hand, it would have relieved the applicants of having to exhaust domestic
remedies in Turkey, which effectively did not exist, due to the aforementioned denial
by authorities and the judiciary’s complicity with state violence. On the other hand,
it would have alleviated the evidentiary difficulties of proving the elements of the
crimes attributed to the state, namely the violations of the right to life in the absence
of a body and the state responsibility amidst government denial that the disappeared
had ever been detained.
The ECtHR built an important jurisprudence finding, inter alia, violations of the
right to liberty and security in the unacknowledged detentions of missing persons
and to effective remedy in the failure of the authorities to conduct meaningful
investigations into disappearances (e.g. 2017 Kurt v. Turkey; 2000 Timurta# v.
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Turkey). And yet, when it came to the crux of the matter, the ECtHR refrained from
saying that the Emperor was naked; namely, that the Turkish state itself has actively
engaged in the practice of enforced disappearances. In the case of 1998 Kurt v.
Turkey, where the applicant cited the WGEID’s report that the highest number
of globally reported enforced disappearance cases of 1994 came from Turkey
(WGEID 1994 Annual Report, para. 402), the ECtHR responded that applicant
rested her case “entirely on presumptions” and failed to adduce “any evidence to
substantiate her claim” (para. 108, 145–146). The ECtHR could have, as Amnesty
International and the applicant urged it to do, followed the example of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) in the Honduran cases. In Velásquez-
Rodríguez, the IACtHR had allowed circumstantial evidence on the grounds “that the
policy of disappearances, supported or tolerated by the Government, is designed
to conceal and destroy evidence of disappearances” and the disappearance of an
individual “would be impossible to prove” without “circumstantial or indirect evidence
or by logical inference” (para. 124, 126). It concluded, on the basis of witness
testimonies, media reports of public statements by high-ranking authorities and
the amicus curiae of human rights organizations, that Honduras had engaged in a
practice of enforced disappearances (para. 147-148). The judgment showed that
it was legally possible for a supranational human rights court to find state practice
in one case alone, where the applicant’s claims are supported by circumstantial
evidence such as reports of independent organizations and news media. And yet,
the ECtHR did not follow suit.
Over time, the ECtHR effectively accepted the existence of a victim profile in cases
concerning enforced disappearances in the Kurdish region (e. g. 2000 Timurta# v.
Turkey). In a case where an individual was disappeared after his abduction by
two armed plainclothes men carrying walkie-talkies who introduced themselves
as police officers, the ECtHR observed that “the manner of his abduction shows
many similarities with the disappearances of persons prior to their being killed
in south-east Turkey at the relevant time which have been examined by the
Court” (2008 Osmano#lu v. Turkey, para. 58). And yet, it still stopped short of
finding an administrative practice. The closest the ECtHR has come to the Inter-
American approach was in the case of 2012 Er v. Turkey, where it noted “the pattern
of disappearances of large numbers of persons in south-east Turkey between 1992
and 1996” (para. 77). Yet, once again, it did not conclude that Turkey engaged in
enforced disappearances as a matter of state policy.
Neither has the ECtHR pushed the Turkish government to adopt measures to
meet the families’ demands for truth and justice. As much as it has repeated the
baseline notion that effective remedies under the ECHR require not only monetary
compensation but also, where possible, the identification and punishment of
perpetrators, it did not use its powers under Article 46 of the Convention to call on
the Turkish government to carry out effective criminal investigations into enforced
disappearances. In another departure from the IACtHR, the ECtHR has never called
on the Turkish government to, for example, uncover the burial sites and preserve
and exhume them in a systematic way and in accordance with international scientific
standards, identify and prosecute perpetrators, remove from its security forces
individuals who engaged in enforced disappearances and other gross violations,
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guarantee the families’ and the judicial authorities’ access to official archives. The
recommendation of such measures would be in line with the Court’s more active
stance in other cases, where it has recommended individual or general measures
under Article 46 ECHR; including a 2013 judgment where it called on Turkey to
carry out effective investigations to identify and prosecute those responsible for
the indiscriminate aerial bombardment of two Kurdish villages in 1994, resulting in
the killing of 34 civilians (2013 Benzer and Others v. Turkey). What is remarkable
about 2013 Benzer and Others is that while condemning Turkey’s unwillingness
to establish the truth and punish the perpetrators, the ECtHR did not address its
own responsibility in condoning this behaviour in 2006 #çyer v. Turkey. In this
inadmissibility decision of 2006, the ECtHR had found a new compensation law
adopted by Turkey to be an effective domestic remedy, although the law provides
partial compensation to only a small group of Kurdish victims and does not entail
even a promise of truth and justice, and rejected up to 1,500 pending applications
(2016 Do#an and Others v. Turkey, para. 6) concerning state violence, including
enforced disappearance cases. Motivated by self-interest to ease its docket crisis,
the ECtHR thus not only abandoned its established case law but also endorsed
Turkey’s impunity regime.
And today?
It should come as no surprise that Turkey continues to disappear its dissidents; it
has always been and remains an authoritarian regime. As of August 2020, the total
figure of disappearances transmitted by the WGEID to the Turkish government has
reached 234 cases (WGEID 2020 Annual Report, p. 32), while according to domestic
NGOs, the number is over 1,300. Certainly, the recent torture and disappearances of
individuals with alleged links to the Gülen movement dwarfs, in terms of quality and
quantity, when compared to the collective punishment of the entire civilian population
in the Kurdish region in the 1990s. Yet, there are also common threads: Then and
now, individuals are labelled as terrorists without a trace of evidence, at best put
behind bars without any due process safeguards and at worst taken off the street
in broad daylight and disappeared. While a few are thus physically removed from
social life or just life, the ones left behind are silenced by example. For they have
been shown time and again that what makes state violence possible is not only the
complicity of an entire state apparatus, but also the appeasement of the international
community.
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